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__________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
The sentencing appeal of defendant Andre Cruz,
following his conviction pursuant to a plea of guilty to
carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, requires us to construe two facets
of the vulnerable victim provisions of § 3A1.1(b) of the
Sentencing Guidelines.

First, we must determine whether the

vulnerable victim enhancement applies to harm caused by the
defendant to someone who was not the victim of the offense of
conviction.

Second, we must decide whether the adjustment can be

made if the defendant did not target (or commit the offense
because of) the vulnerable status of the victim.
Although the latter determination must be made in this
case, because it contributed to a two-level increase in Cruz’s
base offense level, it has little precedential import because the
Sentencing Commission has recently amended the commentary to §
3A1.1 to make clear that there is no targeting requirement.

For

the reasons that follow, we conclude that the vulnerable victim
enhancement applies here even though the victim was only a
passenger in the carjacked vehicle and even though the crime was
not committed with a view to her vulnerability.

We will,

therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court.1
1

Cruz also claims that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at sentencing because his lawyer failed to
object to his criminal history category. He bases his argument
on the contention that the district court incorrectly assessed an
additional point under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), which directs
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I.
The relevant facts are shocking and gruesome.

Stated

succinctly, Cruz, brandishing a semi-automatic pistol, entered
the right front passenger door of the car driven by twenty-six
year old Maribel Nunez.
passenger.

Twelve-year old Brenda Torres was her

Cruz put the gun to Torres’s head, and told them to

give him their money.

After Nunez gave Cruz twenty dollars, he

(..continued)
sentencing courts to add criminal history points if the defendant
committed the offense of conviction within two years of release
from a prior sentence or while the defendant was on escape status
from that sentence. The guideline provides:
Add two points if the defendant committed the instant offense
less than two years after release from confinement on
a sentence under [§ 4A1.1(a) or §
4A1.1(b)] or
while in imprisonment or escape status on such a
sentence. If 2 points are added for item [§
4A1.1(d)] add only 1 point.
Past sentences of imprisonment are assigned criminal history
points under two different provisions: if the defendant served a
sentence of incarceration for an adult conviction, points are
assigned under § 4A1.1(a), (b), and (c), depending on the length
of the sentence, but if the defendant was incarcerated for a
juvenile adjudication, points are assigned under § 4A1.2(d).
Cruz makes the technical argument that the enhancement was based
on the fact that he had escaped from incarceration for a juvenile
robbery adjudication, which was counted under § 4A1.2(d), and
that an adult conviction, which would be counted under § 4A1.1(a)
or (b), is the necessary basis for a § 4A1.1(e) enhancement by
the terms of the provision. This raises, on an adequate record,
a purely legal question, cognizable on direct appeal. See United
States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).
Even though the past offense was assigned criminal
history points under § 4A1.2(d) because it was a juvenile
offense, rather than § 4A1.1(a) or (b), a juvenile offense can
clearly provide the basis for a § 4A1.1(e) enhancement. Section
4A1.2(d) requires that two points be assigned for certain
juvenile offense and specifies that these points are added "under
§ 4A1.1(b)." Hence, criminal history points for juvenile
adjudications are indirectly assigned under § 4A1.1(b) and it
would strain plain meaning to say that an additional point could
not be added under § 4A1.1(e). See, e.g., United States v.
Allen, 64 F.3d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Unger,
915 F.2d 759, 763-64 (1st Cir. 1990). Cruz's agument is thus
patently meritless.
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patted down Torres looking for more money to no avail.
Threatening to kill them if they did not cooperate, he ordered
Nunez to drive, keeping the gun pointed at Torres’s head.
Cruz then ordered Nunez to stop the car, and to get in
the back seat, leaving Torres alone with him in the front seat.
Nunez begged Cruz to leave Torres alone, and told him that "she's
just a little girl," only twelve or thirteen years old.

Cruz

responded, "I don't care," and told Nunez "to shut up.”

He then

raped Torres.

Cruz ordered Nunez and Torres to switch places,

and then raped Nunez and forced her to perform oral sex.

After

raping Nunez, Cruz again raped Torres.
The episode ended when Nunez jumped out of the moving
car onto the pavement, and Cruz eventually stopped the car and
fled.

As might be expected, there was testimony at the

sentencing hearing as to the traumatic effect on Torres of the
carjacking and sexual assault.
denied the rapes.
incarceration.

Cruz admitted the carjacking but

The district court sentenced him to 240 months

Included in the Guidelines calculation was a two-

level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b) because Brenda
Torres was a vulnerable victim.
II.
The vulnerable victim enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b),
provides:
If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the
offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical
or mental condition, or that a victim was particularly
susceptible to the criminal conduct, increase by two
levels.
The application note to the 1995 Guidelines further provides that

4

§ 3A1.1 "applies to offenses involving an unusually vulnerable
victim in which the defendant knows or should have known of the
victim's unusual vulnerability."

1995 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1,

commentary, application note 2.2
Cruz contends that Torres must be a victim of the
offense of conviction (carjacking) for the enhancement to be
applied to him.

The carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119,

subjects to criminal conviction anyone who
with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported,
shipped, or received in interstate commerce from the
person or presence of another by force and violence or
by intimidation, or who attempts to do so . . . .
Because Cruz took the automobile from the “person or presence” of
Nunez not Torres, the argument continues, Torres cannot be the
victim of the carjacking, and the enhancement was therefore
impermissible.

Cruz concedes that, except for the Sixth Circuit,

all of the circuits that have considered this issue have held
that the vulnerable victim does not have to be the victim of the
offense of conviction.

See United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d

175, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d
722, 735 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Callaway, 943 F.2d 29,
31 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Haggard, 41 F.3d 1320, 1326
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lee, 973 F.2d 832, 833-34 (10th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Yount, 960 F.2d 955, 957-58 (11th
Cir. 1992).
2

While Cruz relies on the 1994 pre-amendment commentary for
his second claim on appeal, he does not challenge the application
of the 1995 commentary with respect to this issue.
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Pointing out that the language of § 3A1.1(b) itself
does not require that the vulnerable victim be a victim of the
offense of conviction, these (majority) courts have reasoned that
a sentencing court should not read § 3A1.1(b) narrowly, and thus
may look to the defendant’s underlying conduct to determine
whether the enhancement may be applied.

Haggard, 41 F.3d at 1326

(“[C]ourts may look beyond the four corners of the charge to the
defendant’s underlying conduct in determining whether someone is
a ‘vulnerable victim’ under section 3A1.1.”); Yount, 960 F.2d at
957 (same).

They have relied on § 1B1.3(a)(3), which directs the

sentencing courts to look at “all harm” that results from the
defendant’s conduct in determining his base offense level and
applying relevant adjustments.3
Cruz instead must rely on the minority position, that
of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Wright, 12 F.3d 70 (6th
Cir. 1993), the only court to have held that § 3A1.1 applies only
if the victim is a victim of the offense of conviction.

In that

case, the court held that the language of § 3A1.1(b) itself
requires that result.

It drew on Hughey v. United States, 495

U.S. 411 (1990), in which the Supreme Court defined “victim” for
3

Unlike the case before us, however, none of these cases,
including the Sixth Circuit case, have considered this question
in the context of a violent offense. These cases instead
involved crimes such as fraud, obstruction of justice, or moneylaundering, where an institution such as a bank, the government,
or society at large was the victim, but the enhancement was
applied because vulnerable people (e.g., elderly people) were
part of the conduct underlying the offense in some way (e.g.,
bank accounts, Medicare fraud). Despite this difference, we see
no reason why we should not be guided by these cases in the
disposition of the case at bar.
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purposes of the victim restitution provisions of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”) as covering only those who are
harmed by the conduct that is the basis of the offense of
conviction.

Wright, 12 F.3d at 73.

The Wright court held that § 1B1.3(a)(3) does not
provide otherwise because its commentary specifies that §
1B1.3(a) “‘provides a rule of construction by specifying, in the
absence of more explicit instructions in the context of a
specific guideline, the range of conduct that is relevant to
determining the applicable offense level . . . .’” Id. at 74
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, commentary, background).

Because the

court determined that § 3A1.1(b) provided explicit instructions
itself, it held that § 1B1.3 did not allow a court to apply §
3A1.1 when the victim was not the victim of the offense of
conviction.

Id.

Cruz submits that Torres, the twelve-year old, was not
clearly a victim of the carjacking under the explicit terms of
the carjacking statute because she was not the driver of the car.
By the same token, because Cruz ordered Nunez to drive while
pointing a gun at Torres, it is arguable that Torres was a victim
of the carjacking itself.
not decide them.

These points are unclear, but we need

That is because, believing that the position

taken by the majority of the circuits to be the better one, we
find unpersuasive the claim that the Sixth Circuit’s
understanding of the term “victim” was what the Sentencing
Commission had in mind in drafting § 3A1.1.

We conclude, as did

the other courts, that neither § 3A1.1(b) nor the application
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note explicitly requires that we read "victim" narrowly and that,
under § 1B1.3, we may look at all the conduct underlying the
offense of conviction.

The gruesome facts of the carjacking

described above make it clear beyond cavil that Torres was a
victim for purposes of § 3A1.1 under this standard.
III.
Effective November 1995, the Sentencing Commission
amended the commentary to § 3A1.1, while the text of the
commentary itself remained the same.

Cruz’s second claim on

appeal is that he must be sentenced according to the application
note that was in force when the crime was committed, the 1994
version, rather than the provision in effect at the time of
sentencing, the 1995 version.

The relevant part of the 1994

application note reads: “This adjustment applies to offenses
where an unusually vulnerable victim is made a target of criminal
activity by the defendant.”
application note 1.

1994 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, commentary,

Cruz contends that this commentary requires

that there be evidence that Cruz targeted Torres because of her
age, which he clearly did not, citing cases from other circuits.
See United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Cree, 915 F.2d 352, 353-54 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Sutherland, 955 F.2d 25, 26 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1995).
The government's response is bifurcated.

First, it

contends that the cases just cited are incorrectly decided, even
under the 1994 commentary, and that the better rule (and the one
we should follow) is that expressed by the Second and Ninth

8

Circuits, and most recently, the First Circuit.

Pointing to the

text of the guideline itself, which the Commission has not
amended and which provides that the enhancement is required if
the defendant “knew or should have known” of the victim’s
vulnerability, these circuits have concluded that a targeting
requirement would be inconsistent with this language.
In United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503 (2d Cir.
1992), for example, a detainee was assaulted by a prison guard
while the other guards failed to intervene.

The Second Circuit

there affirmed the two-level increase due to the victim's
vulnerability under the circumstances, relying on the language of
the guideline itself to reject the defendant's contention that
the enhancement should not apply because he had not
"’specifically sought out’ the victim."

Id. at 1506.

The Ninth

Circuit has consistently used this approach, holding that the
government must only show that the defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge of the victim’s vulnerability, see United
States v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
United States v. Caterino, 957 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 843 (1992); United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d
497, 506 (9th Cir. 1990), and the First Circuit has recently
followed suit, holding in a post-amendment case that the preamendment guideline did not contain a targeting requirement,
United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 488 (1st Cir. 1996).4
4

The Gill opinion clarified First Circuit law on this issue,
and specifically noted that United States v. Rowe, 999 F.2d 14,
16-17 (1st Cir. 1993), which contained some confusing language,
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Second, the government points out that there is no
targeting requirement applicable to Cruz's sentence because the
Sentencing Commission, effective November 1, 1995, amended the
commentary to § 3A1.1 to clarify the application of the
guideline.

The commentary on which Cruz relies and which was in

effect on December 8, 1994, the date of the carjacking, stated in
full:
This adjustment applies to offenses where an unusually vulnerable
victim is made a target of criminal activity by the
defendant. The adjustment would apply, for example, in
a fraud case where the defendant marketed an
ineffective cancer cure or in a robbery where the
defendant selected a handicapped victim. But it would
not apply in a case where the defendant sold fraudulent
securities by mail to the general public and one of the
victims happened to be senile. Similarly, for example,
a bank teller is not an unusually vulnerable victim
solely by virtue of the teller's position in a bank.
1994 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, commentary, application note 1 (emphasis
added).
In its November 1, 1995 clarification, the Commission
deleted the first sentence of the pre-November 1, 1995
commentary, including the reference to "target," and replaced it
with:

“Subsection (b) applies to offenses involving an unusually

vulnerable victim in which the defendant knows or should have
known of the victim's unusual vulnerability.”
3A1.1., commentary, application note 2.

1995 U.S.S.G. §

In amending the

guideline as such, the Commission explained:
Although the Commission found that the current guidelines
generally provided adequate penalties in these cases,
it noted some inconsistency in the application of §
3A1.1 regarding whether this adjustment required proof
(..continued)
did not hold that § 3A1.1 had a targeting requirement. Gill, 99
F.3d at 487.
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that the defendant has "targeted the victim on account
of the victim's vulnerability." This amendment revised
the Commentary to § 3A1.1 to clarify application with
respect to this issue.
U.S.S.G. Appendix C, Amendment 521, at 429-30.
Thus, explicitly noting that there had been some
"inconsistency" in the application of § 3A1.1(b), the Commission
clarified that inconsistency by deleting the reference to
"target."

After the amendment to the commentary, the only

requirement for applying the two-level enhancement is that the
defendant knew or should have known of the victim's
vulnerability.

See United States v. Feldman, 83 F.3d 9, 16 (1st

Cir. 1996).
If Cruz would fare worse under the amended guideline
than the one in effect at the time of his offense, ex post facto
considerations would prevent us from applying the amendment.

See

United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that while defendants are generally sentenced under the
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, the Guidelines in
effect at the time of the commission of the offense govern if
they result in a less severe penalty); see also United States v.
Stover, 93 F.3d 1379, 1386 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying targeting
requirement even after amendment to the commentary because of an
ex post facto concern).

Of course, if we were to follow the

precedent in the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, whose case
law conforms with the amendment, there would be no ex post facto
problem.

We do so here.
There is no Third Circuit case law interpreting the
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1994 application note, and we cannot consider the Sentencing
Commission’s clarification of the application note to resolve how
the Third Circuit would have interpreted it.

See United States

v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 567 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1407 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1994).5

We simply

find the cases holding that there was no targeting requirement
under the 1994 guideline to be more persuasive.

More

specifically, the purpose of § 3A1.1, as we see it, is simply to
acknowledge that, while most crimes are committed for other
motives, in many instances defendants know or should know of
their victim's particular vulnerability and are therefore more
blameworthy for knowingly or even negligently harming them.
The text of the guideline itself, see supra p. 5, which
was not amended in 1995, directs that it be applied in any case
where the defendant “knew or should have known” of the victim's
5

Arguably, our decisions in United States v. Astorri, 923
F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1991), and United States v. Seligsohn, 981
F.2d 1418 (3d Cir. 1992), are in accord with the First, Second,
and Ninth Circuit views. At the least, they are not inconsistent
with them.
In Astorri, this Court approved the vulnerable victim
enhancement where a corrupt broker took advantage of his
girlfriend's parents. To reach this holding, we upheld the
district court’s finding that the parents were vulnerable, 923
F.2d at 1055, without mentioning any requirement that Astorri
have targeted his girlfriend’s parents because of their
vulnerability.
Similarly, in Seligsohn, this Court affirmed an upward
departure where the defendants defrauded elderly victims by
selling unnecessary roofing repairs at excessive prices. The
district court enhanced the sentence of the lead defendant
because the elderly victims were vulnerable due to their age, and
this Court affirmed without mentioning a targeting requirement.
981 F.2d at 1426 (“There was adequate evidence in the record to
sustain a finding that the defendants preyed on those
particularly vulnerable individuals.”).
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susceptibility. We agree with the Hershkowitz court that:
[b]y its own terms, § 3A1.1 governs cases in which the defendant
“knew or should have known” of the victim's unusual
vulnerability. It is of no consequence
therefore
whether Hershkowitz actually was conscious of
Campbell's increased vulnerability when he assaulted
him in the corridor and later in the holding cell.
Id. at 1506.

We conclude that, if we were to hold that the 1994

commentary to the guideline required a finding of targeting, we
would undermine the plain language of § 3A1.1 and impose a higher
level of scienter than is required by the provision.

See Stinson

v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1918 (1993) ("If . . . the
commentary and the guideline it interprets are inconsistent in
that following one will result in violating the dictates of the
other, the Sentencing Reform Act itself commands compliance with
the guideline.").

Moreover, we are not persuaded that the 1994

commentary is to the contrary as it, too, does not require that
the defendant targeted the victim because of his or her
vulnerability.

1994 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, commentary, application

note 1 (applies where a vulnerable victim is “made a target of
criminal activity by the defendant” and does not require that the
victim be targeted because of his or her vulnerability).
In sum, the argument that the enhancement can be
assessed only where a defendant purposefully targets a victim
because of his or her vulnerability cannot be reconciled with the
plain language of § 3A1.1 that there should be an enhancement
even in cases where the defendant does not have actual knowledge
of the vulnerability.
standard.

The facts here surely meet the applicable

Cruz at the very least should have known of the
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twelve-year old Torres's vulnerability.

The vulnerable victim

enhancement was therefore properly applied.
IV.
The judgment of the sentence will be affirmed.6

6

Cruz's alternative argument that the rule of lenity
requires resentencing is without merit. The rule of lenity "is
always reserved . . . for those situations in which a reasonable
doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort
to 'the language and structure, legislative history, and
motivating policies' of the statute." Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); accord United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 347 (1971) (reliance on the rule of lenity should occur only
if "[a]fter 'seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be
derived,'" a court is left with an ambiguous statute). Given the
plain meaning of § 3A1.1(b) and its commentary, the rule of
lenity is inapplicable.
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